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Searle's abstract argument against strong AI
Journal Synthese
Publisher Springer Netherlands
ISSN 0039-7857 (Print) 1573-0964 (Online)
... to defend itself against objections Searle makes to it.

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http://www.springerlink.com/content/v404x74w610n4umx/

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Searle's abstract argument against strong AI

Andrew Melnyk1

(1) Department of Philosophy 438 General Classroom Building, University of Missouri — Columbia, 65211 Columbia, MO, USA

Abstract  Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative account which, however, cannot play a role in a Searle-type argument, and argue that Searle gives no good reason for favoring his account, which allows the abstract argument to work, over the alternative, which doesn't. This response to Searle's abstract argument also, incidentally, enables the Robot Reply to the Chinese Room to defend itself against objections Searle makes to it.

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<div class="primitiveControl"><table class="MPReader_Profiles_SpringerLink_Content_PrimitiveHeadingControl" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td><h2 class="MPReader_Profiles_SpringerLink_Content_PrimitiveHeadingControlName">Searle's abstract argument against strong AI </h2><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> <tbody><tr> <td class="labelName">Journal</td><td class="labelValue"><a href="/content/103001/?p=09ff74ac2d534aeea242bd68f0eec486&amp;pi=0">Synthese</a></td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">Publisher</td><td class="labelValue">Springer Netherlands</td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">ISSN</td><td class="labelValue">0039-7857 (Print) 1573-0964 (Online)</td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">Issue</td><td class="labelValue"><a href="/content/r6w43w130657/?p=09ff74ac2d534aeea242bd68f0eec486&amp;pi=0">Volume 108, Number 3 / September, 1996</a></td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">DOI</td><td class="labelValue">10.1007/BF00413696</td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">Pages</td><td class="labelValue">391-419</td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">Subject Collection</td><td class="labelValue"><a href="/humanities-social-sciences-and-law/">Humanities, Social Sciences and Law</a></td> </tr><tr> <td class="labelName">SpringerLink Date</td><td class="labelValue">Thursday, November 11, 2004</td> </tr> </tbody></table></td><td rowspan="2" class="MPReader_Profiles_SpringerLink_Content_PrimitiveHeadingControlSecondaryLinks" valign="top"><div class="MPReader_Profiles_SpringerLink_Content_PrimitiveHeadingControlMarkedItemLink"> <a id="ctl00_PageHeadingContent_ctl00_ToggleMarkedItemLinkButton" href="/content/v404x74w610n4umx/?mark=v404x74w610n4umx" value="v404x74w610n4umx" key="mark" onclickmethod="primitiveHeadingControl_markItem" onclick="return hyperLinkButton_onClick(event);" selectedtext="Remove from marked items" unselectedtext="Add to marked items"><span>Add to marked items</span></a> </div><div> <a href="/content/v404x74w610n4umx/offerings/?p=09ff74ac2d534aeea242bd68f0eec486&amp;pi=0">Add to shopping cart</a> </div><div> <a href="/personalization/save-item.mpx?code=v404x74w610n4umx">Add to saved items</a> </div><div> <a target="_blank" href="https://s100.copyright.com/AppDispatchServlet?publisherName=Springer&amp;imprint=Springer+Netherlands&amp;publication=0039-7857&amp;title=Searle%27s+abstract+argument+against+strong+AI&amp;publicationDate=09%2f01%2f1996&amp;author=Andrew+Melnyk&amp;contentID=10.1007%2fBF00413696&amp;volumeNum=108&amp;issueNum=3&amp;startPage=391&amp;endPage=419&amp;orderBeanReset=true&amp;openAccess=false">Permissions &amp; Reprints</a> </div><div> <a href="/personalization/email-item.mpx?code=v404x74w610n4umx&amp;p=09ff74ac2d534aeea242bd68f0eec486&amp;pi=0">Recommend this article</a> </div></td> </tr><tr> <td></td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="4" height="100%"> <tbody><tr> <td class="defaultHeight" valign="top" width="100%"> <div class="mainPageContentHeading"> <div> <a class="MetaPress_Products_Reader_Web_UI_Controls_IconHyperlink" href="/content/v404x74w610n4umx/fulltext.pdf"><img src="/images/common/spacer.gif" class="sprites pdfSprite" alt="" align="absmiddle">PDF (2.0 MB)</a><a class="MetaPress_Products_Reader_Web_UI_Controls_IconHyperlink" href="/content/v404x74w610n4umx/fulltext.pdf?page=1"><img src="/images/common/spacer.gif" class="sprites pdfSprite" alt="Free Preview" align="absmiddle">Free Preview</a> </div> </div><div class="blob"> <p></p><div class="Heading1"><a name="title"></a>Searle's abstract argument against strong AI</div><p class="AuthorGroup">Andrew&nbsp;Melnyk<sup>1</sup></p><table><tbody><tr valign="top"><td><span class="Affiliation"><a name="Aff1"></a>(1)&nbsp;</span></td><td><span class="Affiliation">Department of Philosophy 438 General Classroom Building, University of Missouri &#x2014; Columbia, 65211&nbsp;Columbia, MO, USA</span></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="Affiliation"></p><div class="Abstract"><a name="Abs1"></a><span class="AbstractHeading">Abstract&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative account which, however, cannot play a role in a Searle-type argument, and argue that Searle gives no good reason for favoring his account, which allows the abstract argument to work, over the alternative, which doesn't. This response to Searle's abstract argument also, incidentally, enables the Robot Reply to the Chinese Room to defend itself against objections Searle makes to it.</div></div></td></tr></tbody></table>